This Courtroom Is Not a Television Studio: Why Judge Fujisaki Made the Correct Call in Gagging the Lawyers and Parties, and Banning the Cameras from the O.J. Simpson Civil Case by Pugsley, Robert A.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-1997
This Courtroom Is Not a Television Studio: Why
Judge Fujisaki Made the Correct Call in Gagging
the Lawyers and Parties, and Banning the Cameras
from the O.J. Simpson Civil Case
Robert A. Pugsley
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert A. Pugsley, This Courtroom Is Not a Television Studio: Why Judge Fujisaki Made the Correct Call in Gagging the Lawyers and
Parties, and Banning the Cameras from the O.J. Simpson Civil Case, 17 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 369 (1997).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr/vol17/iss2/5
THIS COURTROOM
IS NOT A TELEVISION STUDIO:
WHY JUDGE FUJISAKI MADE THE CORRECT
CALL IN GAGGING THE LAWYERS AND
PARTIES, AND BANNING THE CAMERAS FROM
THE O.J. SIMPSON CIVIL CASE
Robert A. Pugsley
There is no question that media coverage can and does affect
the ultimate outcome of widely publicized cases.'
-Robert Shapiro
A sense of mortality should make us smarter.... Life is short,
so you do your work. You don't let your life be eaten by... the
circuses of the media. The Trial of the Century was a pure
waste of time. It was a tar pit, and nobody who went into it
came out smarter or kinder or happier or more enlightened It
had no redeeming aspects; it taught nothing. Midwestern farm
boys can get 18 years in prison for raising marijuana; rich
people can walk away from murder. everyone knew that. Time
to get back 
to work.
2
-- Garrison Keillor
* Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law, Los Angeles. B.A., State
University of New York at Stony Brook. J.D., L.L.M., New York University School of Law. I
am very grateful to the editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal for
including my views in this Symposium, and even more so for their support and patience
throughout. I also wish to gratefully acknowledge the invaluable work of my research assistant,
Wendy L. Wilcox (Southwestern University Class of 1997), without whose many contributions
this Essay would not have been completed.
1. Robert Shapiro, Using the Media to Your Advantage, CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 1993, at 11-
12.
2. Garrison Keillor, In Autumn We All Get Older Again, TIME, Nov. 6, 1995, at 90.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 13, 1996, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Hiroshi
Fujisaki issued a minute order 3 that thunderstruck both a worldwide public
grown dependent on its daily dosage of unfiltered "O.J." and-far more
significantly, I shall argue-the legions of electronic media that both
fueled and supplied an insatiable appetite for diversion from the quotidian
concerns of life on this planet as we knew it before the late evening hours
of June 12, 1994.
In his order, this Judge, who at all costs would not be Judge Lance
Ito,4 applied a double-strength tourniquet to staunch the uncontrollable
hemorrhaging of leaks, rumors, "spin," and demagogic rhetoric that had
drained a sense of fairness and judicial decorum from the moribund body
of People v. Simpson.5  During those nine months of legal and media
excess, as well as in the preliminary hearing that preceded them, virtually
anyone in the world who cared to watch or listen had multiple unfettered
avenues of instantaneous access to the proceedings. People v. Simpson
may or may not have been "The Trial of the Century," but make no
mistake: it was the "Media Mother of All Trials." This was so for several
reasons about which others continue to speculate and argue. 7 Indeed, the
full cultural, legal, political, journalistic, and racial impact of televising the
3. Rufo v. Simpson, No. SC031947 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 20, 1994) (Minute Order
issued Aug. 13, 1996); see also B.J. Palermo, New Judge in Simpson Case Issues Far-Reaching
Gag Order, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 14, 1996, at AI (describing the impact of the order).
4. Judge Lance Ito was the presiding judge in the criminal case of People v. Simpson,
No. BA097211, 1995 WL 704381 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 1995) [hereinafter Simpson]. It has
frequently been remarked by many Simpson trial observers that Judge Fujisaki's judicial
demeanor and rulings from the bench differ markedly-both in style and substance-from those
of Judge Ito. This is an observation that I believe has been borne out repeatedly in the civil trial.
Even though Judge Ito often ruled favorably for the prosecution on contested evidentiary
matters, Judge Fujisaki couples that frequency for the plaintiffs with the particularly
controversial-and potentially appealable-content of his rulings: allowing, for example,
reference to Mr. Simpson's failed polygraph examination, with score, and permitting the
hearsay testimony of a domestic abuse hotline counselor. Both rulings were made over
strenuous defense objection.
5. Id.
6. Professor Gerald Uelmen has valuably identified at least 32 trials since 1900 that have
been called a "trial of the century," which exhibited recurringly similar events. GERALD F.
UELMEN, LESSONS FROM THE TRIAL: THE PEOPLE V. O.J. SIMPSON, 2-8 (1996).
7. See Steven Brill, Televising Trials Is the Democratic Way, POSTMORTEM: THE O.J.
SIMPSON CASE 195-201 (Jeffrey Abramson ed., BASIC BOOKS 1996); see also Lincoln Caplan,
The Failure (and Promise) of Legal Journalism, POSTMORTEM: THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE 202-
10 (Jeffrey Abramson ed., BASIC BOOKS 1996).
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Simpson criminal trial has not yet been fully measured. 8 While we still
conjecture as to what might have occurred at the murder scene, we vividly
retain every memory on videotape libraries of images, sounds, and
experiences of the parties, lawyers, witnesses, and the judge during the
lengthy and divisive legal combat.
Judge Fujisaki's order concerning the conduct of the civil trial cut off
two sources of information that journalists and the public alike had come
to depend on. The first part of his order placed a "gag" on the parties
themselves, their attorneys, and all witnesses over whom the attorneys had
control. 9  This was designed to eliminate the "spin" sessions that the
adversaries had used so frequently and effectively outside the courtroom
during the criminal trial. Calculated rumors, trial theories and tactics, and
most certainly criticism of the other side's evidence, witnesses, and
general performance-this was the stuff that added spice to what the
television viewers had seen for themselves inside in the courtroom.
Although partially regulated by Judge Ito, these forums were never entirely
eliminated.
The second part of Judge Fujisaki's order cut out the very heart of the
electronic media's ability to transform the Simpson civil trial into anything
resembling the behemoth of the criminal proceeding. Quite simply, but
very controversially, the judge banned TV cameras and audio feed for
external transmission from the courtroom.10 Access to the courtroom was
limited to a daily lottery for one of sixteen seats reserved for the general
public, with the remaining seats allocated to journalists. To accommodate
journalist overflow, there would be a closed-access audio feed to an off-
site, makeshift facility containing only folding chairs. Some TV
organizations set up temporary trailers, wooden-planked platforms, and
8. See, e.g., George Lipsitz, The Greatest Story Ever Sold: Marketing and the O.J.
Simpson Trial, in BIRTH OF A NATION'HOOD 3 (Toni Morrison & Claudia Brodsky Lacour eds.
1997); Ishmael Reed, Bigger and O.J., in BIRTH OF A NATION'HOOD 169 (Toni Morrison &
Claudia Brodsky Lacour eds. 1997); Armond White, Eye, the Jury, in BIRTH OF A NATION'HOOD
339 (Toni Morrison & Claudia Brodsky Lacour eds. 1997); TOM ELIAS & DENNIS SCHATZMAN,
THE SIMPSON TRIAL IN BLACK AND WHITE 126, 127 (1996); DONALD FREED & RAYMOND P.
BRIGGS, KILLING TIME 236-40 (1996); JEWELLE TAYLOR GIBBS, RACE AND JUSTICE RODNEY
KING AND O.J. SIMPSON IN A HOUSE DfvIDED 154, 219-20, 273-75, 289-90, 298-99 (1996);
HANK M. GOLDBERG, THE PROSECUTION RESPONDS 360-63 (1996); EARL OFARI HUTCHINSON,
BEYOND O.J.: RACE, SEX, AND CLASS LESSONS FOR AMERICA 49-53 (1996); WENDY
KAMINER, IT'S ALL THE RAGE: CRIME & CULTURE 34-35, 40-42 (1996); JEFFREY TOOBIN,
THE RUN OF His LIFE: THE PEOPLE V. O.J. SIMPSON 112-15, 125-28, 139-40, 145, 167, 191-
93, 198 (1996); THEO WILSON, HEADLINE JUSTICE: INSIDE THE COURTROOM: THE COUNTRY'S
MOST CONTROVERSIAL TRIALS 12-19 (1996).
9. Rufo v. Simpson, No. SC031947 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 20, 1994) (Minute Order
issued Aug. 13, 1996).
10. Id.
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small-scale satellite trucks in the general vicinity of the Santa Monica
courthouse. But even at the civil trial's high points (when the plaintiffs
called O.J. Simpson to the stand in late November 1996; when the
defendants called him in December 1996; and while waiting for the trial's
verdict), this media assemblage within view of the Pacific Ocean was but a
tiny specter compared to the veritable self-contained village nestled among
the concrete canyons of the Criminal Courts Building in downtown Los
Angeles, known as "Camp O.J."
The media's attorneys, not the parties' attorneys, appealed Judge
Fujisaki's order, 11 but succeeded only in gaining reinstatement of a
courtroom sketch artist and retaining closed circuit audio transmission.
The media did not succeed in its prime objective: installing the all-seeing
camera, the very umbilical cord of instantaneous, unrehearsed legal
proceedings as daytime television drama. This ruling was, indeed, a big
loss for the media, though not, I will argue, for the public it presumes to
serve. 13 Far more importantly, it was a major step in facilitating a fair and
orderly proceeding for the litigants.
In Section II, this Article will briefly outline the constitutional
principles underlying Judge Fujisaki's gag order. Section III will identify
some of the dangers to a fair proceeding that aggressive media coverage of
high-profile cases present, particularly the Simpson criminal case. Many
of these problems would have simply repeated themselves in the
subsequent Simpson civil case, but for the proper and necessary imposition
of the gag order fashioned by Judge Fujisaki.
Section IV will briefly trace the relevant law governing the televising
and/or radio broadcasting of trials in California. Section V will detail the
reasons why Judge Fujisaki's exercise of discretion to ban cameras from
the civil trial was both legally and prudentially correct. Section VI will
review the impact that televising the Simpson criminal trial has already
had on the decisions of other courts in high-profile cases in California and
the nation, with regard to electronic broadcast of their proceedings.
Included in this Section are some provisional thoughts on judicial practice
in this area for both the present and the future.
11. See Palermo, supra note 3, at Al.
12. See generally WILSON, supra note 8, at 18.
13. See GOLDBERG, supra note 8, at 360-63 (quoting Robert Lind, Book Review:
Defender of the Faith in the Midst of the Simpson Circus, Sw. U. L. REV. 1215, 1215-16
(1995)).
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II. THE GAG ORDER
Since the issue of denying actual media access to the courtroom
proceedings is not contemplated by Judge Fujisaki's order, I will sidestep
that body of constitutional law that has consistently reaffirmed the
presumptive openness of criminal trials, and by extension civil trials, to the
public and the press. 14 Despite some of the more alarmist reactions to his
order by the media's representatives, this is not an edict the judge laid
down.
Federal constitutional tension between a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial and the media's First Amendment right-
exercised as surrogate on behalf of the people to report on that trial--dates
back at least to the 1807 trial of Aaron Burr. 15 In the foundational case of
the modem era, Sheppard v. Maxwell,16 attorney F. Lee Bailey persuaded
the Warren Court that irreparable damage to a fair trial had occurred due to
unrestrained pretrial publicity concerning prejudicial matters. The Court
recognized that imposing restrictive "gag orders" on trial participants
constituted a prior restraint. However, the Court drew an important
distinction whose constitutional vitality extends to the present moment:
gag orders restrict what participants can say to the press, but do not restrict
or prevent the press from reporting the trial and speaking to other sources.
This type of gag order, then, is not considered a prior restraint on the press
itself, but only on some sources of information. Imposing restraint on
those with the most at stake in the proceeding-the parties and their
attorneys-is the most direct and least intrusive of the seven possible
remedies the Court outlined for securing as fair a trial as possible in the
face of aggressive, extensive, and sustained media activity.' 7  Sheppard
marked the Court's willingness to deal with the facts of trial life in an age
of mass, and sometimes crass, media.
A decade later, the Court revisited the issue of prior restraint in the
media's coverage of yet another murder trial. In Nebraska Press Ass 'n v.
Stuart,18 the Court invalidated a trial court order that had imposed a
blanket gag order on the press from reporting "any testimony given or
14. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
15. United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 49 (1807).
16. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
17. Id. at 358-63. The seven remedies include: limiting the number of reporters allowed
in the courtroom; insulating the witnesses; controlling the release of information and gossip to
the press by parties and witnesses involved; and proscribing extrajudicial statements. Id.
18. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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evidence adduced"' 19 at trial, holding that any court-imposed prior restraint
on the media violated the First Amendment. The Court further
articulated a "heavy burden" test requiring less legally Draconian methods
of avoiding unfair prejudice to the accused. This test rendered closing
the courtroom door to the press an unconstitutional form of prior restraint.
The majority opinion, however, repeatedly suggested (though did not
precisely hold) that gag orders on the participants, if necessary, were a less
intrusive and constitutionally permissible method of insuring a defendant's
right to a fair trial.22 In the absence of a clear holding on this issue by the
U.S. Supreme Court, the circuit courts of appeals have divided. The Ninth
Circuit has upheld gag orders on trial participants requiring the trial court
to determine whether it is reasonably likely that the pretrial publicity will
jeopardize the accused's right to a fair trial.23  California law is in
accord.
24
A related but separate weapon in the quest to keep a trial within the
courtroom and off the courthouse steps lies in the realm of rules governing
lawyers' professional conduct. Indeed, catalyzed by the excesses of
lawyers' extrajudicial speech during the entire Simpson criminal trial, the
California legislature mandated the State Bar to develop and submit for the
state supreme court's adoption a rule of professional conduct on this very
subject. The result was California Rule of Professional Conduct (CRPC)
Rule 5-120, 26 which became effective on October 1, 1995.
Disagreement exists as to whether a disciplinary action for
professional misconduct or the trial court's traditional remedies of venue
change, voir dire to detect media exposure and/or gag orders on the parties
and lawyers remain better suited to achieve the goal of curtailing
prejudicial speech and publicity outside the courtroom before and during a
trial. Interestingly, as noted in Levine v. United States District Court, the
standard for participant gag orders is one of "reasonable likelihood" that
27publicity will endanger an accused's right to a fair trial. The standard of
CRPC Rule 5-120, taken from ABA Model Rule 3.6,28 is violated when a
19. Id. at 542.
20. Id. at 569-70.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 569.
23. Levine v. United States Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590, 601 (9th Cir. 1985).
24. People v. Watson, 15 Cal. App. 3d 28, 41 (1971).
25. See 254, Reg. Sess. (Ca. 1993-94).
26. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5-120 (1995).
27. Levine, 764 F. 2d at 596.
28. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1995).
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lawyer's extrajudicial speech would create a "substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing" an adjudicative proceeding. In California, then,
either remedial avenue rests on a constitutionally firm standard of
"sufficient probability" rather than the more demanding scale of "clear and
present danger."
30
In view of this standard, Judge Fujisaki's choice of the gag order
seems the wiser course. It is immediate, based on specific determinations
of relevant facts appealable, and--depending on an appeal's outcome-
establishes a clear rule for the case. In that sense, such an order provides
greater prophylaxis than the uncertain, after-the-fact evaluation through
the State Bar disciplinary process. Of course, neither remedy is redundant
nor mutually exclusive. The significant point for this Article is that both
the California Rule and Judge Fujisaki's prospective gag order for the
Simpson civil trial were the direct result of the out-of-control "media
circus" into which the Simpson criminal case grew.
III. DANGERS OF MEDIA COVERAGE IN HIGH PROFILE CASES
Trial publicity guidelines may be insufficiently precise, and court gag
orders may be endlessly arguable-and that is as it should be in a society
covetous of its robust tradition and philosophy of press freedom. But, as
with every other exercise of cherished freedoms within the limits of social
constraint, there inevitably comes the case that at once defies and demands
a boundary on those freedoms, lest the fragile system that attempts to
protect them is itself overwhelmed. Simpson was, and is, one such case.
Simpson criminal defense lawyer Robert L. Shapiro addressed the
central role media relations have assumed in modem high-profile cases in
a 1993 article directed to the pragmatic concerns of litigators.3 1  In
retrospect, Shapiro's article proved both prescient and yet barely
suggestive of the efforts needed and developed by the defense and the
prosecution to keep their respective rafts afloat in the midst of the media
tidal wave that engulfed the Simpson criminal trial. In that event, not only
did the media become an observer and recorder of proceedings in the
courtroom, but also of events outside it. More than once, the media,
unwittingly or otherwise, became a big-stakes player in the phenomenon of
People v. Simpson. This reality included providing leaked details of the
initial police investigation well in advance of the preliminary hearing,
some of which were erroneous, and covering live and endlessly
29. Id. at 3.6(a).
30. See id.; see also Levine, 764 F. 2d at 595.
31. See Shapiro, supra note 1.
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rebroadcasting Kardashian's reading of the "suicide note," and press
conferences by police, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. Also, potential
witnesses damaged their credibility and lost their trial value by selling
their information to TV and print tabloids. All of this was only to be
topped off by the most massively watched segment of freeway driving in
California history. Throughout this event, all parties played spin and spin-
control to a frenzied media that was predictably feeding an insatiable
public. And this was only the first week! But it set the oversized,
uncontrollable tone of lawyers in and on the media that lasted for the next
sixteen months.
IV. CALIFORNIA LAW GOVERNING CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM
There are no television cameras permitted in federal courtrooms,
despite experiments with their use.32 In contrast, there is no constitutional
impediment to TV cameras in state courts, provided they do not distract
the jurors and witnesses, or unduly burden the judge, thereby depriving the
defendant of a fair trial. The Supreme Court's views on this issue have
kept pace with TV technology. As cameras became smaller and less
obtrusive, the Court's concerns about their violating a defendant's fair trial
rights have diminished. In Chandler v. Florida,33 the Court held that the
Constitution does not prohibit a state from experimenting with televised
34trials. Cameras would be barred only if the defendant could make a
showing that the media's coverage of his case compromised the ability of
his jury to judge the case fairly.
35
On the other hand, there is no right of any party or the public to have
a trial televised or radio broadcast. Consequently, California, like several
other states, leaves the matter to the discretion of the trial court. California
Rules of Court 980 permits, but does not require, the judge to allow a
camera in the courtroom. Additionally, as occurred in the Simpson case,
when an alternative juror is inadvertently and identifiably shown on
camera, the judge has authority to terminate coverage. Indeed, Rule 980
focuses on protecting the defendant's right to a fair trial, rather than a
different and potentially competing interest of whether restricting TV
32. Michael Kirkland, No Cameras in Federal Courtrooms, UPI, Sept. 21, 1994, available
in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File; see also Charles Whitebread & Darrell W. Contreras, Free
Press v. Fair Trial: Protecting the Criminal Defendant's Rights in a Highly Publicized Trial by
Applying the Sheppard-Mu 'min Remedy, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1587, 1595-96 (1996).
33. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
34. Id. at 583.
35. Id. at 582.
36. CAL. R. CT. 980 (West 1996).
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coverage is an unconstitutional form of prior restraint upon the media.
37
Even in the age of television, the public's access to a trial is not limited to
that medium alone. In the Simpson civil trial, journalists from both
electronic and print media had access to the courtroom, but were required
to go outside to file their reports on camera, the radio airwaves, or the
printed page.
V. JUDGE FUJIsAKI'S RULING
Within the Simpson criminal trial, most of the media's participant-
observer glitches were attributable to the real-time electronic broadcast of
the proceedings on a gavel-to-gavel basis, especially by television camera.
As Ellis Cose opined, "Many journalists and others idealistically believed
that televised trials would enhance the quality of justice and increase
general knowledge about the courts by providing public oversight not
previously available. Unfortunately, this was not the case." 38 Television
did not deter lying witnesses; instead, it rendered many truthful ones
nervous and inarticulate.
Television provided the temptation, and the opportunity, for media-
savvy lawyers and a media-conscious judge to sell their respective cases
not merely to the jury, but literally to the world. The camera in this case
and in this courtroom proved to be a world class platform for the
rhetorician, a snare for the unwary, a seducer and mirror to the vain, an
indiscriminate and often harsh recorder of humor, wit, guile, trickery, and
lies, and the transmitter to the world of both excellent and poor lawyering
on both sides.
39
The initial joinder in a marriage of convenience between television
and Simpson eventually became more than either the criminal justice
system or electronic journalism could reasonably sustain or contain. It is
fair to say that only a prophet could have foreseen what was to be, and
none of us may rightfully claim that title. Quite the opposite.
37. Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 2, at 1596; see also revised amendments to CAL.
R. CT. 980, effective January 1, 1997, reiterating and expanding a trial court's discretionary
authority over electronic coverage, including and especially TV cameras, in the courtroom.
38. Ellis Cose, Finding Balance in the OJ Trials, USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 1997, at I IA.
39. See id. Cose described the camera's presence as turning "the judge into an idiot and
the lawyers into second-rate actors and served the audience a diet of rambling, self-indulgent
lawyerly soliloquies." Id. According to prominent defense attorney, Leslie Abramson, Judge
Lance Ito told her that one of his two mistakes during the criminal trial was allowing cameras in
the courtroom. Scott Kaufer, The Trials of Leslie Abramson, Buzz, Feb. 1997, at 56. The other
mistake Judge Ito was alleged to have acknowledged was admitting the dream evidence, which
was "incredibly prejudicial and foolish ... ." Id.
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At the outset, Judge Lance Ito's exercise of discretion to permit a
camera in the courtroom and to allow simultaneous radio broadcast was
welcomed as enlightened; a window opened onto a world for which the
public pays but rarely experiences. Besides all the obvious elements of
courtroom drama inherent in a first-degree, double murder case, Simpson
had a lot of extras: a defendant of icon status in the worlds of sport and
celebrity; teams of highly-trained attorneys; and specialists in the
developing science of forensic DNA. The major national and international
television networks, as well as local networks, dedicated significant blocks
of time, top-level reporters, and interpretive legal analysts to inform and
enlighten the public about what an American criminal trial can be when
both sides pour very substantial financial and personnel resources into it.
No one could have foreseen what I have just barely begun to
describe. I personally was a legal commentator on the case, a role that
many embraced and, I am sure, so many more disdained.4 0 This
phenomenon grew bigger and faster than ever could have been anticipated.
It assumed a life of its own, and took over the lives-in one way or
another-of thousands or millions of people. So, let me be very clear: this
Article is bom of hindsight, most certainly not prescience. There is no
judgment intended or implied here of the key players and the decisions
they made regarding lawyers' and clients' speech, or concerning the
unobtrusive but all-seeing eye in the back comer of Judge Ito's courtroom.
But one reward of experience is, occasionally, the opportunity to
avoid repeating a mistake. In addition to all that the Simpson criminal trial
was and will remain-a social, political, cultural, racial, legal, and moral
event of mammoth proportions-it is a yardstick against which to evaluate
how encompassing and intense the relationship among the courts, the
public, and the media that link them should be. Sometimes a full gazing
embrace will leave all enlightened and ennobled. At other times, the
continued vitality of the relationship calls for a slightly-studied distance, a
more filtered form of ongoing communication. In either case, the judge
must face the question and choose. Judge Fujisaki did, and I honor the
decision he made.
VI. THE IMPACT OF THE SIMPSON CRIMINAL CASE
Many critics of the Simpson criminal trial's media coverage have
dubbed the event a "media circus" that should never have been allowed
40. See e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky & Laurie Levenson, The Ethics of Being a Commentator,
69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1303 (1996); Erwin Chemerinsky, Is It the Siren's Call?: Judges and Free
Speech While Cases Are Pending, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 831 (1995).
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and most certainly should never be repeated. Other parties, whose own
broadcasting corporations and financial interests were intimately involved
in transmitting the trial, made a more circumscribed complaint. They felt
live gavel-to-gavel TV coverage was fine so long as it was "serious
minded" (their coverage), as distinguished from "entertainment oriented"
(several other entities providing live coverage or edited daily reports).
Finally, some disinterested critics suggested that a gag order on the parties
and the attorneys would have retained the requisite decorum of the
criminal proceedings, and that TV transmission was not inimical to an
orderly and fair trial. Presumably, the latter two groups of critics would
have merged support for the televising of the Simpson civil trial.
I wish to state a different position. First, let me distance myself
totally from certain politicians' proposals made in the immediate aftermath
of the Simpson criminal trial that cameras be banned from all California
courtrooms. Such a Draconian and inflexible reaction to the perceived
excesses of the Simpson criminal trial coverage would be an unwarranted
and unnecessary interference with the informative access to public
governmental proceedings that the technology of TV and radio can afford
the public. The experiments with televised trial coverage blessed by
Chandler v. Florida and carried out so successfully in California and
many other states should most definitely not be aborted in response to one
aberrational event.
Second, let me emphasize my increased respect for the great majority
of the journalistic community-electronic and print-that developed and
grew over the many grueling months of the Simpson criminal trial
coverage. I accord the same respect for my fellow members of the
"Simpson commentocracy," including those whose views on various issues
differed sharply from mine. For my argument in this Article, I choose not
to rely on purported aesthetic distinctions-ultimately subjective if not
arbitrary-between "good/responsible" coverage and "trash/tabloid"
coverage. Let the viewer/listener beware.
In this connection, let me express a personal concern regarding
"infotainment," misleading "docudramas," and "reality-based"
dramatizations on all variety of news events, not just criminal trials. The
blur between reality and fiction, news and entertainment, is a significant
and growing problem for news media generally, and television news in
particular. Some-not most-coverage of the Simpson criminal trial may
have capitalized on and even accelerated this disturbing trend. But this has
been an ongoing issue within the broadcast industry, one that did not start
41. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
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with TV coverage of Simpson. Also, it is a question that will not somehow
be answered by a media ban of future trials.
Further in this vein, "tabloid TV" and the long-established print
tabloid "newspapers" are a genre unto themselves. Their tactics and
"standards" speak for themselves, yet the First Amendment protects their
access to a marketplace that consistently demonstrates their enduring
popularity. All that might be usefully said here about the "tabs," notably
the print National Enquirer, is that frequently they got the day's story
correct and first.
Third, for reasons stated earlier in this Article, I believe-with
wisdom born only of hindsight-that a gag rule on the parties and lawyers
alone would have proven insufficient to allow Judge Ito to have retained
control of the unwieldy monstrosity that the Simpson criminal trial
eventually became. While some of the most poignant and provocative
statements were uttered on the courthouse steps, a far greater number of
TV-oriented moments were played out in the courtroom to a watching
world. Besides the verbal clashes in excess of what would probably
otherwise have occurred, remember fondly, if you will, both sides'
inevitable efforts to dominate the "cliffhanger moment" that would leave
the world in suspense from Friday afternoon until Monday morning. Now,
that's television.
What was intended, and often realized, as an educational insight for
the public into the workings of their criminal justice system often
devolved-because of the camera's presence-into an unedifying,
cynicism-producing spectacle that left many in the audience wondering
angrily what any of this had to do with the "truth" or "justice" or a
"system," and for what exactly their taxes were being used for.
Fourth, the ultimate and only legal basis on which to argue in support
of Judge Fujisaki's order to both gag the parties and their attorneys, and
ban the camera from the Simpson civil trial is that, in my opinion, it has
facilitated the fairest possible trial for the litigants. The absence of a
camera enabled their attorneys to focus all their professional energies in
the courtroom, maximized the decorum and efficiency of the trial
proceedings, and eliminated any possible anxiety the witnesses, jurors and
alternates might have felt because of the camera's presence. At the same
time, it allowed for full and robust media coverage of the trial in a way that
has served our nation well for the first 200 years of its existence.
Individual trial court judges in California and other states where
cameras are permitted have exercised their discretion to exclude cameras
in the interests of a fair trial for all parties. Most of these have been "high-
profile" cases: an infamous defendant, a celebrity participant, or a
THIS COURTROOM IS NOTA TELEVISION STUDIO
particularly heinous crime-especially if the victim was a child. In short,
cases whose real-time televising could easily engender community
prejudice, taint the potential juror pool, and unnecessarily expose the
parties to prejudicial publicity. In each of the cases of which I am aware, I
believe the trial court made the correct decisions.
That does not mean, however, the end of televising/broadcasting
controversial trials on difficult subjects. Such trials, I am certain, will-
and rightly so-be televised and provide both education-and probably
diversion for the viewing audience. As the public learns more of the
realities of the "ordinary" trials, both criminal and civil, it will also learn to
discriminate between the ordinary and the sensational. It should and must
retain the right to view both. And as trial judges become more
comfortable and confident in their assessment of the impact of televising a
given trial on the fairness to the parties in that trial, I think we will see a
healthy percentage of controversial, "high-profile" cases televised.
Besides the arguments for the parties and the judges' own growing
experience in these matters, criteria for guiding judges' decisions do
exist.42 The ultimate concern is to subordinate the media coverage to theessential fairness of the proceedings for the parties.
VII. CONCLUSION
Judge Fujisaki's orders to ban the camera from the courtroom, and
gag the parties, lawyers and witnesses produced a businesslike, legally
focused trial. His action has deservedly drawn praise from many. It is,
after all, the law and legal process that people want to know about. When,
in a particular case, the electronic media present an impediment to fair
legal process-and the media become the message-then it's time to pull
the plug.
42. CAL. R. CT. 980 (West 1996).
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